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Subject: 89-1799 -- OPINION, MASSON v. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, INC.




NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-1799



JEFFREY M. MASSON, PETITIONER v. NEW
YORKER MAGAZINE, INC., ALFRED A.
KNOPF, INC. and JANET MALCOLM


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth
circuit

[June 20, 1991]



    Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
    In this libel case, a public figure claims he was defamed by an author
who, with full knowledge of the inaccuracy, used quotation marks to
attribute to him comments he had not made.  The First Amendment protects
authors and journalists who write about public figures by requiring a
plaintiff to prove that the defamatory statements were made with what we
have called "actual malice," a term of art denoting deliberate or reckless
falsification.  We consider in this opinion whether the attributed
quotations had the degree of falsity required to prove this state of mind,
so that the public figure can defeat a motion for summary judgment and
proceed to a trial on the merits of the defamation claim.
I


    Petitioner Jeffrey Masson trained at Harvard University as a Sanskrit
scholar, and in 1970 became a professor of Sanskrit & Indian Studies at the
University of Toronto.  He spent eight years in psychoanalytic training,
and qualified as an analyst in 1978.  Through his professional activities,
he came to know Dr. Kurt Eissler, head of the Sigmund Freud Archives, and
Dr. Anna Freud, daughter of Sigmund Freud and a major psychoanalyst in her
own right.  The Sigmund Freud Archives, located at Maresfield Gardens
outside of London, serves as a repository for materials about Freud,
including his own writings, letters, and personal library.  The materials,
and the right of access to them, are of immense value to those who study
Freud, his theories, life and work.
    In 1980, Eissler and Anna Freud hired petitioner as Projects Director
of the Archives.  After assuming his post, petitioner became disillusioned
with Freudian psychology.  In a 1981 lecture before the Western New England
Psychoanalytical Society in New Haven, Connecticut, he advanced his
theories of Freud.  Soon after, the Board of the Archives terminated
petitioner as Projects Director.
    Respondent Janet Malcolm is an author and a contributor to respondent
The New Yorker, a weekly magazine.  She contacted petitioner in 1982
regarding the possibility of an article on his relationship with the
Archives.  He agreed, and the two met in person and spoke by telephone in a
series of interviews.  Based on the interviews and other sources, Malcolm
wrote a lengthy article.  One of Malcolm's narrative devices consists of
enclosing lengthy passages in quotation marks, reporting statements of
Masson, Eissler, and her other subjects.
    During the editorial process, Nancy Franklin, a member of the
fact-checking department at The New Yorker, called petitioner to confirm
some of the facts underlying the article.  According to petitioner, he
expressed alarm at the number of errors in the few passages Franklin
discussed with him.  Petitioner contends that he asked permission to review
those portions of the article which attributed quotations or information to
him, but was brushed off with a never-fulfilled promise to "get back to
[him]."  App. 67.  Franklin disputes petitioner's version of their
conversation.  App. 246-247.
    The New Yorker published Malcolm's piece in December 1983, as a
two-part series.  In 1984, with knowledge of at least petitioner's general
allegation that the article contained defamatory material, respondent
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., published the entire work as a book, entitled In the
Freud Archives.
    Malcolm's work received complimentary reviews.  But this gave little
joy to Masson, for the book portrays him in a most unflattering light.
According to one reviewer,
"Masson the promising psychoanalytic scholar emerges gradually, as a
grandiose egotist -- mean-spirited, selfserving, full of braggadocio,
impossibly arrogant and, in the end, a self-destructive fool.  But it is
not Janet Malcolm who calls him such: his own words reveal this
psychological profile -- a self-portrait offered to us through the efforts
of an observer and listener who is, surely, as wise as any in the
psychoanalytic profession."  Coles, Freudianism Confronts Its Malcontents,
Boston Globe, May 27, 1984, pp. 58, 60.
    Petitioner wrote a letter to the New York Times Book Review calling the
book "distorted."  In response, Malcolm stated:
    "Many of [the] things Mr. Masson told me (on tape) were discreditable
to him, and I felt it best not to include them.  Everything I do quote Mr.
Masson as saying was said by him, almost word for word.  (The `almost'
refers to changes made for the sake of correct syntax.)  I would be glad to
play the tapes of my conversation with Mr. Masson to the editors of The
Book Review whenever they have 40 or 50 short hours to spare."  App.
222-223.
    Petitioner brought an action for libel under California law in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
During extensive discovery and repeated amendments to the complaint,
petitioner concentrated on various passages alleged to be defamatory,
dropping some and adding others.  The tape recordings of the interviews
demonstrated that petitioner had, in fact, made statements substantially
identical to a number of the passages, and those passages are no longer in
the case.  We discuss only the passages relied on by petitioner in his
briefs to this Court.
    Each passage before us purports to quote a statement made by petitioner
during the interviews.  Yet in each instance no identical statement appears
in the more than 40 hours of taped interviews.  Petitioner complains that
Malcolm fabricated all but one passage; with respect to that passage, he
claims Malcolm omitted a crucial portion, rendering the remainder
misleading.
    (a) "Intellectual Gigolo."  Malcolm quoted a description by petitioner
of his relationship with Eissler and Anna Freud as follows:
" `Then I met a rather attractive older graduate student and I had an
affair with her.  One day, she took me to some art event, and she was sorry
afterward.  She said, "Well, it is very nice sleeping with you in your
room, but you're the kind of person who should never leave the room --
you're just a social embarrassment anywhere else, though you do fine in
your own room."  And you know, in their way, if not in so many words,
Eissler and Anna Freud told me the same thing.  They like me well enough
"in my own room."  They loved to hear from me what creeps and dolts
analysts are.  I was like an intellectual gigolo -- you get your pleasure
from him, but you don't take him out in public. . . .' "  In the Freud
Archives 38.
The tape recordings contain the substance of petitioner's reference to his
graduate student friend, App. 95, but no suggestion that Eissler or Anna
Freud considered him, or that he considered himself, an " `intellectual
gigolo.' "  Instead, petitioner said:
"They felt, in a sense, I was a private asset but a public liability. . . .
They liked me when I was alone in their living room, and I could talk and
chat and tell them the truth about things and they would tell me.  But that
I was, in a sense, much too junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for
these important training analysts to be caught dead with me."  Id., at
104.
    (b) "Sex, Women, Fun."  Malcolm quoted petitioner as describing his
plans for Maresfield Gardens, which he had hoped to occupy after Anna
Freud's death:
" `It was a beautiful house, but it was dark and sombre and dead.  Nothing
ever went on there.  I was the only person who ever came.  I would have
renovated it, opened it up, brought it to life.  Maresfield Gardens would
have been a center of scholarship, but it would also have been a place of
sex, women, fun.  It would have been like the change in The Wizard of Oz,
from black-and-white into color.' "  In the Freud Archives 33.
The tape recordings contain a similar statement, but in place of the
reference to "sex, women, fun," and The Wizard of Oz, petitioner
commented:
"[I]t is an incredible storehouse.  I mean, the library, Freud's library
alone is priceless in terms of what it contains: all his books with his
annotations in them; the Schreber case annotated, that kind of thing.  It's
fascinating."  App. 127.
Petitioner did talk, earlier in the interview, of his meeting with a London
analyst:
"I like him.  So, and we got on very well.  That was the first time we ever
met and you know, it was buddybuddy, and we were to stay with each other
and [laughs] we were going to pass women on to each other, and we were
going to have a great time together when I lived in the Freud house.  We'd
have great parties there and we were [laughs] --
    . . . . .


    ". . . going to really, we were going to live it up."  Id., at 129.
    (c) "It Sounded Better."  Petitioner spoke with Malcolm about the
history of his family, including the reasons his grandfather changed the
family name from Moussaieff to Masson, and why petitioner adopted the
abandoned family name as his middle name.  The article contains the
passage:
" `My father is a gem merchant who doesn't like to stay in any one place
too long.  His father was a gem merchant, too -- a Bessarabian gem
merchant, named Moussaieff, who went to Paris in the twenties and adopted
the name Masson.  My parents named me Jeffrey Lloyd Masson, but in 1975 I
decided to change my middle name to Moussaieff -- it sounded better.' "  In
the Freud Archives 36.
In the most similar tape recorded statement, Masson explained at
considerable length that his grandfather had changed the family name from
Moussaieff to Masson when living in France, "[j]ust to hide his
Jewishness."  Petitioner had changed his last name back to Moussaieff, but
his thenwife Terry objected that "nobody could pronounce it and nobody knew
how to spell it, and it wasn't the name that she knew me by."  Petitioner
had changed his name to Mous saieff because he "just liked it."  "[I]t was
sort of part of analysis: a return to the roots, and your family tradition
and so on."  In the end, he had agreed with Terry that "it wasn't her name
after all," and used Moussaieff as a middle instead of a last name.  App.
87-89.
    (d) "I Don't Know Why I Put It In."  The article recounts part of a
conversation between Malcolm and petitioner about the paper petitioner
presented at his 1981 New Haven lecture:
"[I] asked him what had happened between the time of the lecture and the
present to change him from a Freudian psychoanalyst with somewhat outre
views into the bitter and belligerent anti-Freudian he had become.
    "Masson sidestepped my question.  `You're right, there was nothing
disrespectful of analysis in that paper,' he said.  `That remark about the
sterility of psychoanalysis was something I tacked on at the last minute,
and it was totally gratuitous.  I don't know why I put it in.' "  In the
Freud Archives 53.
The tape recordings instead contain the following discussion of the New
Haven lecture:
Masson: "So they really couldn't judge the material.  And, in fact, until
the last sentence I think they were quite fascinated.  I think the last
sentence was an in, [sic] possibly, gratuitously offensive way to end a
paper to a group of analysts.  Uh, -- "
Malcolm: "What were the circumstances under which you put it [in]? . . ."
Masson: "That it was, was true.
    . . . . .


    ". . . I really believe it.  I didn't believe anybody would agree with
me.
    . . . . .


    ". . . But I felt I should say something because the paper's still well
within the analytic tradition in a sense. . . .
    . . . . .


    ". . . It's really not a deep criticism of Freud.  It contains all the
material that would allow one to criticize Freud but I didn't really do it.
And then I thought, I really must say one thing that I really believe,
that's not going to appeal to anybody and that was the very last sentence.
Because I really do believe psychoanalysis is entirely sterile . . . ."
App. 176.
    (e) "Greatest Analyst Who Ever Lived."  The article contains the
following self-explanatory passage:
    "A few days after my return to New York, Masson, in a state of elation,
telephoned me to say that Farrar, Straus & Giroux has taken The Assault on
Truth [Masson's book].  `Wait till it reaches the best-seller list, and
watch how the analysts will crawl,' he crowed.  `They move whichever way
the wind blows.  They will want me back, they will say that Masson is a
great scholar, a major analyst -- after Freud, he's the greatest analyst
who ever lived.  Suddenly they'll be calling, begging, cajoling: "Please
take back what you've said about our profession; our patients are
quitting."  They'll try a short smear campaign, then they'll try to buy me,
and ultimately they'll have to shut up.  Judgment will be passed by
history.  There is no possible refutation of this book.  It's going to
cause a revolution in psychoanalysis.  Analysis stands or falls with me
now.' "  In the Freud Archives 162.
This material does not appear in the tape recordings.  Petitioner did make
the following statements on related topics in one of the taped interviews
with Malcolm:
    ". . . I assure you when that book comes out, which I honestly believe
is an honest book, there is nothing, you know, mean-minded about it.  It's
the honest fruit of research and intellectual toil.  And there is not an
analyst in the country who will say a single word in favor of it."  App.
136.
"Talk to enough analysts and get them right down to these concrete issues
and you watch how different it is from my position.  It's utterly the
opposite and that's finally what I realized, that I hold a position that no
other analyst holds, including, alas, Freud.  At first I thought: Okay,
it's me and Freud against the rest of the analytic world, or me and Freud
and Anna Freud and Kur[t] Eissler and Vic Calef and Brian Bird and Sam
Lipton against the rest of the world.  Not so, it's me.  it's me alone."
Id., at 139.
The tape of this interview also contains the following exchange between
petitioner and Malcolm:
Masson: ". . . analysis stands or falls with me now."
Malcolm: "Well that's a very grandiose thing to say."
Masson: "Yeah, but it's got nothing to do with me.  It's got to do with the
things I discovered."  Id., at 137.
    (f) "He Had The Wrong Man."  In discussing the Archives' board meeting
at which petitioner's employment was terminated, Malcolm quotes petitioner
as giving the following explanation of Eissler's attempt to extract a
promise of confidentiality:
" `[Eissler] was always putting moral pressure on me.  "Do you want to
poison Anna Freud's last days?  Have you no heart?  You're going to kill
the poor old woman."  I said to him, "What have I done?  You're doing it.
You're firing me.  What am I supposed to do -- be grateful to you?"  "You
could be silent about it.  You could swallow it.  I know it is painful for
you.  But you could just live with it in silence."  "Why should I do that?"
"Because it is the honorable thing to do."  Well, he had the wrong man.' "
In the Freud Archives 67.
From the tape recordings, on the other hand, it appears that Malcolm
deleted part of petitioner's explanation (italicized below), and petitioner
argues that the "wrong man" sentence relates to something quite different
from Eissler's entreaty that silence was "the honorable thing."  In the
tape recording, petitioner states:
    "But it was wrong of Eissler to do that, you know.  He was constantly
putting various kinds of moral pressure on me and, `Do you want to poison
Anna Freud's last days?  Have you no heart?'  He called me: `Have you no
heart?  You're going to kill the poor old woman.  Have you no heart?  Think
of what she's done for you and you are now willing to do this to her.'  I
said, `What have I, what have I done?  You did it.  You fired me.  What am
I supposed to do: thank you? be grateful to you?'  He said, `Well you could
never talk about it.  You could be silent about it.  You could swallow it.
I know it's painful for you but just live with it in silence.'  `Fuck you,'
I said, `Why should I do that?  Why?  You know, why should one do that?'
`Because it's the honorable thing to do and you will save face.  And who
knows?  If you never speak about it and you quietly and humbly accept our
judgment, who knows that in a few years if we don't bring you back?'  Well,
he had the wrong man."  App. 215-216.
    Malcolm submitted to the District Court that not all of her discussions
with petitioner were recorded on tape, in particular conversations that
occurred while the two of them walked together or traveled by car, while
petitioner stayed at Malcolm's home in New York, or while her tape recorder
was inoperable.  She claimed to have taken notes of these unrecorded
sessions, which she later typed, then discarding the handwritten originals.
Petitioner denied that any discussion relating to the substance of the
article occurred during his stay at Malcolm's home in New York, that
Malcolm took notes during any of their conversations, or that Malcolm gave
any indication that her tape recorder was broken.
    Respondents moved for summary judgment.  The parties agreed that
petitioner was a public figure and so could escape summary judgment only if
the evidence in the record would permit a reasonable finder of fact, by
clear and convincing evidence, to conclude that respondents published a
defamatory statement with actual malice as defined by our cases.  Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255-256 (1986).  The District Court
analyzed each of the passages and held that the alleged inaccuracies did
not raise a jury question.  The court found that the allegedly fabricated
quotations were either substantially true, or were " `one of a number of
possible rational interpretations' of a conversation or event that
`bristled with ambiguities,' " and thus were entitled to constitutional
protection.  686 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (1987) (quoting Bose Corp. v.
Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 512 (1984)).
The court also ruled that the "he had the wrong man" passage involved an
exercise of editorial judgment upon which the courts could not intrude.
686 F. Supp., at 1403-1404.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting.  895 F. 2d
1535 (CA9 1989).  The court assumed for much of its opinion that Malcolm
had deliberately altered each quotation not found on the tape recordings,
but nevertheless held that petitioner failed to raise a jury question of
actual malice, in large part for the reasons stated by the District Court.
In its examination of the "intellectual gigolo" passage, the court agreed
with the District Court that petitioner could not demonstrate actual malice
because Malcolm had not altered the substantive content of petitioner's
self-description, but went on to note that it did not consider the
"intellectual gigolo" passage defamatory, as the quotation merely reported
Kurt Eissler's and Anna Freud's opinions about petitioner.  In any event,
concluded the court, the statement would not be actionable under the "
`incremental harm branch' of the `libelproof' doctrine," id., at 1541
(quoting Herbert v. Lando, 781 F. 2d 298, 310-311 (CA2 1986)).
    The dissent argued that any intentional or reckless alteration would
prove actual malice, so long as a passage within quotation marks purports
to be a verbatim rendition of what was said, contains material
inaccuracies, and is defamatory.  895 F. 2d, at 1562-1570.  We granted
certiorari, 498 U. S. --- (1990), and now reverse.
II
A


    Under California law, "[l]ibel is a false and unprivileged publication
by writing . . . which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a
tendency to injure him in his occupation."  Cal. Civ. Code Ann. MDRV 45
(West 1982).  False attribution of statements to a person may constitute
libel, if the falsity exposes that person to an injury comprehended by the
statute.  See Selleck v. Globe International, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123,
1132, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 844 (1985); Cameron v. Wernick, 251 Cal. App. 2d
890, 60 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1967); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal.
App. 2d 207, 213, 127 P. 2d 577, 581 (1942); cf. Baker v. Los Angeles
Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 260-261, 721 P. 2d 87, 90-91 (1986).  It
matters not under California law that petitioner alleges only part of the
work at issue to be false.  "[T]he test of libel is not quantitative; a
single sentence may be the basis for an action in libel even though buried
in a much longer text," though the California courts recognize that
"[w]hile a drop of poison may be lethal, weaker poisons are sometimes
diluted to the point of impotency."  Washburn v. Wright, 261 Cal. App. 2d
789, 795, 68 Cal. Rptr. 224, 228 (1968).
    The First Amendment limits California's libel law in various respects.
When, as here, the plaintiff is a public figure, he cannot recover unless
he proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the
defamatory statement with actual malice, i. e., with "knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."  New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280 (1964).  Mere negligence does
not suffice.  Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the author "in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication," St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968), or acted with a "high degree
of awareness of . . . probable falsity," Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S.
64, 74 (1964).
    Actual malice under the New York Times standard should not be confused
with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite
or ill will.  See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler,
398 U. S. 6 (1970).  We have used the term actual malice as a shorthand to
describe the First Amendment protections for speech injurious to reputation
and we continue to do so here.  But the term can confuse as well as
enlighten.  In this respect, the phrase may be an unfortunate one.  See
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U. S. 657, 666, n. 7
(1989).  In place of the term actual malice, it is better practice that
jury instructions refer to publication of a statement with knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or falsity.  This definitional
principle must be remembered in the case before us.
B


    In general, quotation marks around a passage indicate to the reader
that the passage reproduces the speaker's words verbatim.  They inform the
reader that he or she is reading the statement of the speaker, not a
paraphrase or other indirect interpretation by an author.  By providing
this information, quotations add authority to the statement and credibility
to the author's work.  Quotations allow the reader to form his or her own
conclusions, and to assess the conclusions of the author, instead of
relying entirely upon the author's characterization of her subject.
    A fabricated quotation may injure reputation in at least two senses,
either giving rise to a conceivable claim of defamation.  First, the
quotation might injure because it attributes an untrue factual assertion to
the speaker.  An example would be a fabricated quotation of a public
official admitting he had been convicted of a serious crime when in fact he
had not.
    Second, regardless of the truth or falsity of the factual matters
asserted within the quoted statement, the attribution may result in injury
to reputation because the manner of expression or even the fact that the
statement was made indicates a negative personal trait or an attitude the
speaker does not hold.  John Lennon once was quoted as saying of the
Beatles, "We're more popular than Jesus Christ now."  Time, Aug. 12, 1966,
p. 38.  Supposing the quotation had been a fabrication, it appears
California law could permit recovery for defamation because, even without
regard to the truth of the underlying assertion, false attribution of the
statement could have injured his reputation.  Here, in like manner, one
need not determine whether petitioner is or is not the greatest analyst who
ever lived in order to determine that it might have injured his reputation
to be reported as having so proclaimed.
    A self-condemnatory quotation may carry more force than criticism by
another.  It is against self-interest to admit one's own criminal
liability, arrogance, or lack of integrity, and so all the more easy to
credit when it happens.  This principle underlies the elemental rule of
evidence which permits the introduction of admissions, despite their
hearsay character, because we assume "that persons do not make statements
which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they
are true."  Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(3), 28 U.
S. C. App., p. 789 (citing Hileman v. Northwest Engineering Co., 346 F. 2d
668 (CA6 1965)).
    Of course, quotations do not always convey that the speaker actually
said or wrote the quoted material.  "Punctuation marks, like words, have
many uses.  Writers often use quotation marks, yet no reasonable reader
would assume that such punctuation automatically implies the truth of the
quoted material."  Baker v. Los Angeles Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d, at 263, 721
P. 2d, at 92.  In Baker, a television reviewer printed a hypothetical
conversation between a station vice president and writer/producer, and the
court found that no reasonable reader would conclude the plaintiff in fact
had made the statement attributed to him.  Id., at 267, 721 P. 2d, at 95.
Writers often use quotations as in Baker, and a reader will not reasonably
understand the quotations to indicate reproduction of a conversation that
took place.  In other instances, an acknowledgement that the work is
so-called docudrama or historical fiction, or that it recreates
conversations from memory, not from recordings, might indicate that the
quotations should not be interpreted as the actual statements of the
speaker to whom they are attributed.
    The work at issue here, however, as with much journalistic writing,
provides the reader no clue that the quotations are being used as a
rhetorical device or to paraphrase the speaker's actual statements.  To the
contrary, the work purports to be nonfiction, the result of numerous
interviews.  At least a trier of fact could so conclude.  The work contains
lengthy quotations attributed to petitioner, and neither Malcolm nor her
publishers indicate to the reader that the quotations are anything but the
reproduction of actual conversations.  Further, the work was published in
The New Yorker, a magazine which at the relevant time seemed to enjoy a
reputation for scrupulous factual accuracy.  These factors would, or at
least could, lead a reader to take the quotations at face value.  A
defendant may be able to argue to the jury that quotations should be viewed
by the reader as nonliteral or reconstructions, but we conclude that a
trier of fact in this case could find that the reasonable reader would
understand the quotations to be nearly verbatim reports of statements made
by the subject.
C


    The constitutional question we must consider here is whether, in the
framework of a summary judgment motion, the evidence suffices to show that
respondents acted with the requisite knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard as to truth or falsity.  This inquiry in turn requires us to
consider the concept of falsity; for we cannot discuss the standards for
knowledge or reckless disregard without some understanding of the acts
required for liability.  We must consider whether the requisite falsity
inheres in the attribution of words to the petitioner which he did not
speak.
    In some sense, any alteration of a verbatim quotation is false.  But
writers and reporters by necessity alter what people say, at the very least
to eliminate grammatical and syntactical infelicities.  If every alteration
constituted the falsity required to prove actual malice, the practice of
journalism, which the First Amendment standard is designed to protect,
would require a radical change, one inconsistent with our precedents and
First Amendment principles.  Petitioner concedes this absolute definition
of falsity in the quotation context is too stringent, and acknowledges that
"minor changes to correct for grammar or syntax" do not amount to falsity
for purposes of proving actual malice.  Brief for Petitioner 18, 36-37.  We
agree, and must determine what, in addition to this technical falsity,
proves falsity for purposes of the actual malice inquiry.
    Petitioner argues that, excepting correction of grammar or syntax,
publication of a quotation with knowledge that it does not contain the
words the public figure used demonstrates actual malice.  The author will
have published the quotation with knowledge of falsity, and no more need be
shown.  Petitioner suggests that by invoking more forgiving standards the
Court of Appeals would permit and encourage the publication of falsehoods.
Petitioner believes that the intentional manufacture of quotations does not
"represen[t] the sort of inaccuracy that is commonplace in the forum of
robust debate to which the New York Times rule applies," Bose Corp., 466 U.
S., at 513, and that protection of deliberate falsehoods would hinder the
First Amendment values of robust and well-informed public debate by
reducing the reliability of information available to the public.
    We reject the idea that any alteration beyond correction of grammar or
syntax by itself proves falsity in the sense relevant to determining actual
malice under the First Amendment.  An interviewer who writes from notes
often will engage in the task of attempting a reconstruction of the
speaker's statement.  That author would, we may assume, act with knowledge
that at times she has attributed to her subject words other than those
actually used.  Under petitioner's proposed standard, an author in this
situation would lack First Amendment protection if she reported as
quotations the substance of a subject's derogatory statements about
himself.
    Even if a journalist has tape recorded the spoken statement of a public
figure, the full and exact statement will be reported in only rare
circumstances.  The existence of both a speaker and a reporter; the
translation between two media, speech and the printed word; the addition of
punctuation; and the practical necessity to edit and make intelligible a
speaker's perhaps rambling comments, all make it misleading to suggest that
a quotation will be reconstructed with complete accuracy.  The use or
absence of punctuation may distort a speaker's meaning, for example, where
that meaning turns upon a speaker's emphasis of a particular word.  In
other cases, if a speaker makes an obvious misstatement, for example by
unconscious substitution of one name for another, a journalist might alter
the speaker's words but preserve his intended meaning.  And conversely, an
exact quotation out of context can distort meaning, although the speaker
did use each reported word.
    In all events, technical distinctions between correcting grammar and
syntax and some greater level of alteration do not appear workable, for we
can think of no method by which courts or juries would draw the line
between cleaning up and other changes, except by reference to the meaning a
statement conveys to a reasonable reader.  To attempt narrow distinctions
of this type would be an unnecessary departure from First Amendment
principles of general applicability, and, just as important, a departure
from the underlying purposes of the tort of libel as understood since the
latter half of the 16th century.  From then until now, the tort action for
defamation has existed to redress injury to the plaintiff's reputation by a
statement that is defamatory and false.  See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co., 497 U. S. 1, --- (1990).  As we have recognized, "[t]he legitimate
state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of
individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood."  Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 341 (1974).  If an author alters a
speaker's words but effects no material change in meaning, including any
meaning conveyed by the manner or fact of expression, the speaker suffers
no injury to reputation that is compensable as a defamation.
    These essential principles of defamation law accommodate the special
case of inaccurate quotations without the necessity for a discrete body of
jurisprudence directed to this subject alone.  Last Term, in Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., we refused "to create a wholesale defamation exemption
for anything that might be labeled `opinion.' "  497 U. S., at --- (slip
op., at 16) (citation omitted).  We recognized that "expressions of
`opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact."  Ibid.  We
allowed the defamation action to go forward in that case, holding that a
reasonable trier of fact could find that the so-called expressions of
opinion could be interpreted as including false assertions as to factual
matters.  So too in the case before us, we reject any special test of
falsity for quotations, including one which would draw the line at
correction of grammar or syntax.  We conclude, rather, that the exceptions
suggested by petitioner for grammatical or syntactical corrections serve to
illuminate a broader principle.
    The common law of libel takes but one approach to the question of
falsity, regardless of the form of the communication.  See Restatement
(Second) of Torts MDRV 563, Comment c (1977); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R.
Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 776 (5th ed. 1984).
It overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth.
As in other jurisdictions, California law permits the defense of
substantial truth, and would absolve a defendant even if she cannot
"justify every word of the alleged defamatory matter; it is sufficient if
the substance of the charge be proved true, irrespective of slight
inaccuracy in the details."  B. Witkin, Summary of California Law, MDRV 495
(9th ed. 1988) (citing cases).  In this case, of course, the burden is upon
petitioner to prove falsity.  See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U. S. 767, 775 (1986).  The essence of that inquiry, however, remains
the same whether the burden rests upon plaintiff or defendant.  Minor
inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as "the substance, the gist,
the sting, of the libelous charge be justified."  Heuer v. Kee, 15 Cal.
App. 2d. 710, 714, 59 P. 2d 1063, 1064 (1936); see also Alioto v. Cowles
Communications, Inc., 623 F. 2d 616, 619 (CA9 1980); Maheu v. Hughes Tool
Co., 569 F. 2d 459, 465-466 (CA9 1978).  Put another way, the statement is
not considered false unless it "would have a different effect on the mind
of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced."  R.
Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 138 (1980); see, e. g., Wheling
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 721 F. 2d 506, 509 (CA5 1983); see
generally R. Smolla, Law of Defamation MDRV 5.08 (1991).  Our definition of
actual malice relies upon this historical understanding.
    We conclude that a deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a
plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of falsity for purposes of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 279-280, and Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., supra, at 342, unless the alteration results in a material
change in the meaning conveyed by the statement.  The use of quotations to
attribute words not in fact spoken bears in a most important way on that
inquiry, but it is not dispositive in every case.
    Deliberate or reckless falsification that comprises actual malice turns
upon words and punctuation only because words and punctuation express
meaning.  Meaning is the life of language.  And, for the reasons we have
given, quotations may be a devastating instrument for conveying false
meaning.  In the case under consideration, readers of In the Freud Archives
may have found Malcolm's portrait of petitioner especially damning because
so much of it appeared to be a selfportrait, told by petitioner in his own
words.  And if the alterations of petitioner's words gave a different
meaning to the statements, bearing upon their defamatory character, then
the device of quotations might well be critical in finding the words
actionable.
D


    The Court of Appeals applied a test of substantial truth which, in
exposition if not in application, comports with much of the above
discussion.  The Court of Appeals, however, went one step beyond protection
of quotations that convey the meaning of a speaker's statement with
substantial accuracy and concluded that an altered quotation is protected
so long as it is a "rational interpretation" of an actual statement,
drawing this standard from our decisions in Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U. S.
279 (1971), and Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U. S. 485 (1984).  Application of our protection for rational
interpretation in this context finds no support in general principles of
defamation law or in our First Amendment jurisprudence.  Neither Time, Inc.
v. Pape, nor Bose Corp., involved the fabrication of quotations, or any
analogous claim, and because many of the quotations at issue might
reasonably be construed to state or imply factual assertions that are both
false and defamatory, we cannot accept the reasoning of the Court of
Appeals on this point.
    In Time, Inc. v. Pape, we reversed a libel judgment which arose out of
a magazine article summarizing a report by the United States Commission on
Civil Rights discussing police civil rights abuses.  The article quoted the
Commission's summary of the facts surrounding an incident of police
brutality, but failed to include the Commission's qualification that these
were allegations taken from a civil complaint.  The Court noted that "the
attitude of the Commission toward the factual verity of the episodes
recounted was anything but straightforward," and distinguished between a
"direct account of events that speak for themselves," 401 U. S., at 285,
286, and an article descriptive of what the Commission had reported.  Time,
Inc. v. Pape took into account the difficult choices that confront an
author who departs from direct quotation and offers his own interpretation
of an ambiguous source.  A fair reading of our opinion is that the
defendant did not publish a falsification sufficient to sustain a finding
of actual malice.
    In Bose Corp., a Consumer Reports reviewer had attempted to describe in
words the experience of listening to music through a pair of loudspeakers,
and we concluded that the result was not an assessment of events that speak
for themselves, but " `one of a number of possible rational
interpretations' of an event `that bristled with ambiguities' and
descriptive challenges for the writer."  466 U. S., at 512 (quoting Time,
Inc. v. Pape, supra, at 290).  We refused to permit recovery for choice of
language which, though perhaps reflecting a misconception, represented "the
sort of inaccuracy that is commonplace in the forum of robust debate to
which the New York Times rule applies."  466 U. S., at 513.
    The protection for rational interpretation serves First Amendment
principles by allowing an author the interpretive license that is necessary
when relying upon ambiguous sources.  Where, however, a writer uses a
quotation, and where a reasonable reader would conclude that the quotation
purports to be a verbatim repetition of a statement by the speaker, the
quotation marks indicate that the author is not involved in an
interpretation of the speaker's ambiguous statement, but attempting to
convey what the speaker said.  This orthodox use of a quotation is the
quintessential "direct account of events that speak for themselves."  Time,
Inc. v. Pape, supra, at 285.  More accurately, the quotation allows the
subject to speak for himself.
    The significance of the quotations at issue, absent any qualification,
is to inform us that we are reading the statement of petitioner, not
Malcolm's rational interpretation of what petitioner has said or thought.
Were we to assess quotations under a rational interpretation standard, we
would give journalists the freedom to place statements in their subjects'
mouths without fear of liability.  By eliminating any method of
distinguishing between the statements of the subject and the interpretation
of the author, we would diminish to a great degree the trustworthiness of
the printed word, and eliminate the real meaning of quotations.  Not only
public figures but the press doubtless would suffer under such a rule.
Newsworthy figures might become more wary of journalists, knowing that any
comment could be transmuted and attributed to the subject, so long as some
bounds of rational interpretation were not exceeded.  We would ill serve
the values of the First Amendment if we were to grant near absolute,
constitutional protection for such a practice.  We doubt the suggestion
that as a general rule readers will assume that direct quotations are but a
rational interpretation of the speaker's words, and we decline to adopt any
such presumption in determining the permissible interpretations of the
quotations in question here.
III
A


    We apply these principles to the case before us.  On summary judgment,
we must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the the nonmoving
party, including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded
particular evidence.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S., at 255.
So we must assume, except where otherwise evidenced by the transcripts of
the tape recordings, that petitioner is correct in denying that he made the
statements attributed to him by Malcolm, and that Malcolm reported with
knowledge or reckless disregard of the differences between what petitioner
said and what was quoted.
    Respondents argue that, in determining whether petitioner has shown
sufficient falsification to survive summary judgment, we should consider
not only the tape recorded statements but also Malcolm's typewritten notes.
We must decline that suggestion.  To begin with, petitioner affirms in an
affidavit that he did not make the complained of statements.  The record
contains substantial additional evidence, moreover, evidence which, in a
light most favorable to petitioner, would support a jury determination
under a clear and convincing standard that Malcolm deliberately or
recklessly altered the quotations.
    First, many of the challenged passages resemble quotations that appear
on the tapes, except for the addition or alteration of certain phrases,
giving rise to a reasonable inference that the statements have been
altered.  Second, Malcolm had the tapes in her possession and was not
working under a tight deadline.  Unlike a case involving hot news, Malcolm
cannot complain that she lacked the practical ability to compare the tapes
with her work in progress.  Third, Malcolm represented to the
editor-in-chief of The New Yorker that all the quotations were from the
tape recordings.  Fourth, Malcolm's explanations of the time and place of
unrecorded conversations during which petitioner allegedly made some of the
quoted statements have not been consistent in all respects.  Fifth,
petitioner suggests that the progression from typewritten notes, to
manuscript, then to galleys provides further evidence of intentional
alteration.  Malcolm contests petitioner's allegations, and only a trial on
the merits will resolve the factual dispute.  But at this stage, the
evidence creates a jury question whether Malcolm published the statements
with knowledge or reckless disregard of the alterations.
B


    We must determine whether the published passages differ materially in
meaning from the tape recorded statements so as to create an issue of fact
for a jury as to falsity.
    (a) "Intellectual Gigolo."  We agree with the dissenting opinion in the
Court of Appeals that "[f]airly read, intellectual gigolo suggests someone
who forsakes intellectual integrity in exchange for pecuniary or other
gain."  895 F. 2d, at 1551.  A reasonable jury could find a material
difference between the meaning of this passage and petitioner's
tape-recorded statement that he was considered "much too junior within the
hierarchy of analysis, for these important training analysts to be caught
dead with [him]."
    The Court of Appeals majority found it difficult to perceive how the
"intellectual gigolo" quotation was defamatory, a determination supported
not by any citation to California law, but only by the argument that the
passage appears to be a report of Eissler's and Anna Freud's opinions of
petitioner.  Id., at 1541.  We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
most natural interpretation of this quotation is not an admission that
petitioner considers himself an intellectual gigolo but a statement that
Eissler and Anna Freud considered him so.  It does not follow, though, that
the statement is harmless.  Petitioner is entitled to argue that the
passage should be analyzed as if Malcolm had reported falsely that Eissler
had given this assessment (with the added level of complexity that the
quotation purports to represent petitioner's understanding of Eissler's
view).  An admission that two well-respected senior colleagues considered
one an "intellectual gigolo" could be as or more damaging than a similar
selfappraisal.  In all events, whether the "intellectual gigolo" quotation
is defamatory is a question of California law.  To the extent that the
Court of Appeals based its conclusion in the First Amendment, it was
mistaken.
    The Court of Appeals relied upon the "incremental harm" doctrine as an
alternative basis for its decision.  As the court explained it, "[t]his
doctrine measures the incremental reputational harm inflicted by the
challenged statements beyond the harm imposed by the nonactionable
remainder of the publication."  Ibid.; see generally Note, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
1909 (1985); R. Smolla, Law of Defamation MDRV 9.10[4][d] (1991).  The
court ruled, as a matter of law, that "[g]iven the . . . many provocative,
bombastic statements indisputably made by Masson and quoted by Malcolm, the
additional harm caused by the `intellectual gigolo' quote was nominal or
nonexistent, rendering the defamation claim as to this quote
nonactionable."  895 F. 2d, at 1541.
    This reasoning requires a court to conclude that, in fact, a plaintiff
made the other quoted statements, cf. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 241
U. S. App. D. C. 246, 251, 746 F. 2d 1563, 1568 (1984), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 477 U. S. 242 (1986), and then to undertake a
factual inquiry into the reputational damage caused by the remainder of the
publication.  As noted by the dissent in the Court of Appeals, the most
"provocative, bombastic statements" quoted by Malcolm are those complained
of by petitioner, and so this would not seem an appropriate application of
the incremental harm doctrine.  895 F. 2d, at 1566.
    Furthermore, the Court of Appeals provided no indication whether it
considered the incremental harm doctrine to be grounded in California law
or the First Amendment.  Here, we reject any suggestion that the
incremental harm doctrine is compelled as a matter of First Amendment
protection for speech.  The question of incremental harm does not bear upon
whether a defendant has published a statement with knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.  As a question of state
law, on the other hand, we are given no indication that California accepts
this doctrine, though it remains free to do so.  Of course, state tort law
doctrines of injury, causation, and damages calculation might allow a
defendant to press the argument that the statements did not result in any
incremental harm to a plaintiff's reputation.
    (b) "Sex, Women, Fun."  This passage presents a closer question.  The
"sex, women, fun" quotation offers a very different picture of petitioner's
plans for Maresfield Gardens than his remark that "Freud's library alone is
priceless."  See supra, at 5.  Petitioner's other tape-recorded remarks did
indicate that he and another analyst planned to have great parties at the
Freud house and, in a context that may not even refer to Freud house
activities, to "pass women on to each other."  We cannot conclude as a
matter of law that these remarks bear the same substantial meaning as the
quoted passage's suggestion that petitioner would make the Freud house a
place of "sex, women, fun."
    (c) "It Sounded Better."  We agree with the District Court and the
Court of Appeals that any difference between petitioner's tape-recorded
statement that he "just liked" the name Moussaieff, and the quotation that
"it sounded better" is, in context, immaterial.  Although Malcolm did not
include all of petitioner's lengthy explanation of his name change, she did
convey the gist of that explanation: Petitioner took his abandoned family
name as his middle name.  We agree with the Court of Appeals that the words
attributed to petitioner did not materially alter the meaning of his
statement.
    (d) "I Don't Know Why I Put It In."  Malcolm quotes petitioner as
saying that he "tacked on at the last minute" a "totally gratuitous" remark
about the "sterility of psychoanalysis" in an academic paper, and that he
did so for no particular reason.  In the tape recordings, petitioner does
admit that the remark was "possibly [a] gratuitously offensive way to end a
paper to a group of analysts," but when asked why he included the remark,
he answered "[because] it was true . . . I really believe it."  Malcolm's
version contains material differences from petitioner's statement, and it
is conceivable that the alteration results in a statement that could injure
a scholar's reputation.
    (e) "Greatest Analyst Who Ever Lived."  While petitioner did, on
numerous occasions, predict that his theories would do irreparable damage
to the practice of psychoanalysis, and did suggest that no other analyst
shared his views, no taperecorded statement appears to contain the
substance or the arrogant and unprofessional tone apparent in this
quotation.  A material difference exists between the quotation and the
tape-recorded statements, and a jury could find that the difference exposed
petitioner to contempt, ridicule or obloquy.
    (f) "He Had The Wrong Man."  The quoted version makes it appear as if
petitioner rejected a plea to remain in stoic silence and do "the honorable
thing."  The tape-recorded version indicates that petitioner rejected a
plea supported by far more varied motives: Eissler told petitioner that not
only would silence be "the honorable thing," but petitioner would "save
face," and might be rewarded for that silence with eventual reinstatement.
Petitioner described himself as willing to undergo a scandal in order to
shine the light of publicity upon the actions of the Freud Archives, while
Malcolm would have petitioner describe himself as a person who was "the
wrong man" to do "the honorable thing."  This difference is material, a
jury might find it defamatory, and, for the reasons we have given, there is
evidence to support a finding of deliberate or reckless falsification.
C


    Because of the Court of Appeals' disposition with respect to Malcolm,
it did not have occasion to address petitioner's argument that the District
Court erred in granting summary judgment to The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,
and Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. on the basis of their respective relations with
Malcolm or the lack of any independent actual malice.  These questions are
best addressed in the first instance on remand.
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.


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